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Conventional studies on left-wing decline focus primarily on the electoral losses of left-wing parties. This contribution argues that left wing decline should not only be understood in terms of support, but also in terms of ideological positioning. The Left may be in decline because of electoral support or because left-wing parties cease to be Left. More fundamentally the Left may be in decline because left-wing ideologies no longer inform public policy or shape political conflict, which points to a more metapolitical shift in "hegemonic ideology". Taking this into account has important implications for understanding Left decline (and eventual revival). As will be demonstrated in six different scenarios, the Left may decline because of electoral shifts to the right or because parties reposition themselves to the right. Reviving the Left therefore not only implies that Left-wing parties win back voters, but it can also be achieved on a so-called metapolitical level: by shifting ideological positions or even hegemonic ideology to the Left. It is argued that especially with regard to shifting ideological positions, smaller parties in the political margins play a crucial role. The article concludes by discussing the implications and challenges for different political parties as well as the way in which political scientists can more comprehensively assess Left decline.

In a recent contribution Hendrikse (2018) has coined the concept of neo-illiberalism to capture mainstreaming of illiberal doctrines among neoliberal elites, thereby signifying a "mutation and restoration of transatlantic neoliberalism." After a critical appraisal of his concept, this essay argues that it is too early to claim that neoliberalism is mutated and suggests that the present conjuncture can better be termed ill-neoliberal instead. Following several scholars who have argued that we have arrived at an interregnum, I argue, by also applying a Gramscian framework, that neoliberalism is increasingly malfunctioning, "ill" or even dying, while something new is yet to be born. Unlike most Gramscian reasoning, however, I do not regard the rise of Trump or the European far right as "morbid symptoms", but as attempted remedies for neoliberalism. In this "restoration perspective" neoliberal elites, somewhat reluctantly, welcome illiberal actors and doctrines in an effort to keep existing hierarchies in place, or to even restore old ones. This transformation in the West towards illiberalism differs, then, from the emerging (and already) illiberal or authoritarian world powers such as China who increasingly rely on an ever-growing private economy and can therefore more rightfully be considered "neo-illiberal" (cf. Aiyar 2016). Whether such powers will be able to install a new (global) order depends foremost on the ability of the atlantic heartlands to overcome neoliberalism.

AbstractCorporate elite studies have for long investigated networks of interlocking directorates to test and corroborate key theoretical expectations regarding the cohesive organization of such an elite and their ability and willingness to act on behalf of general business interests. These studies typically collect data on a list of 50, 100, 200 or 500 corporations ranked by economic size, sometimes stratified in sectors. The sampling approach often follows previous studies in order to increase comparability. These relatively arbitrary sampling practices are problematic because they impact the empirical results and our therefore the conclusions drawn from it. Using a sample of 3251 Canada‐based corporations, we establish that indeed different sampling criteria – that is sample size, proportion of financial firms, inclusion of state‐owned enterprises and so on – significantly impacts network properties of corporate elite networks. We establish rather disturbing differences, especially for smaller sample sizes (<100). Subsequently, we develop alternative demarcation criteria of the corporate elite based on a k‐core decomposition. We conclude by emphasizing that the sampling decisions in interlocking directorate studies should much more be carefully be thought through in future research on the topic, both in corporate elite studies and beyond.